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APPELLANTf S REPLY BRIEF 
Appellant, by and through counsel, submits the following Reply 
to Respondent LDS Hospital's Brief on Appeal in the above-entitled 
case. References to LDS Hospital's brief will be designated LDS 
Brief, p. ; references to the Record On Appeal will be R- ; 
references to the Trial Transcript [R-763-68] will be Tr. ; and 
references to the Supplemental Record On Appeal consisting of 
further Trial Transcript [R-769-771] will be designated by record 
and page number. 
Respondent Michael Lahey, M.D., has also filed a Brief in this 
appeal. However, no response from Appellant to that brief is 
necessary, since Appellant agrees completely with Dr. Lahey1s 
position on the facts and law. The Trial Court clearly erred in 
failing to grant Appellant's Motion for a Directed Verdict in favor 
of Dr. Lahey [Lahey Brief, pp. 4, 6] and Dr. Lloyd. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S REPLY 
Since Appellant was deprived of an adequate opportunity to 
object at trial, this Court should review Appellant's claims of 
error in the Jury Instructions and Special Verdict in the interests 
of justice pursuant to U.R.Civ.P. 51. 
Respondent LDS Hospital has failed to provide any persuasive 
argument or authority to excuse the trial court's refusal to 
instruct the jury as to Appellant's theory of the case or to justify 
the legally erroneous instructions given to the jury. Likewise, 
Respondent has offered no legitimate justification for the fact that 
the Special Verdict form effectively precluded any opportunity for 
the jury to award Appellant damages for the injuries suffered by 
B e t t y Gecrorr o r i ^ i t o L^L : ea r K A p p e l l a n t ' s c a s e f.:\ " h i s 
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t ^'-- "'i4 - v, e r r o r s , which were compounded ~2 
c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o grant , A p p e l l a n t a New T r i a l . 
APPELLANT'S REPLX TQ RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT 
I . THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW APPELLANT'S CLAIMS 
OF ERROR IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL 
VERDICT FORM UNDER RULE *1 U . R . C i v . P , 
^e soonde ' " - "hough knowinq b e t t e r , c l a i m s tha*. A p p e l l a n t d id 
n o t vjr» "pe t • * - " • - ; , • *
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PaltQn, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 1987); and Beehive Medical 
Electronics, Inc. v. Square D Co.. 669 P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 1983). 
In this case, Appellant had absolutely no opportunity to object 
to the final Instructions before they were read to the jury. Note 
that Appellant's extensive recitation of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the Jury Instructions is not challenged or rebutted by 
Respondent in any way. See, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR J.N.O.V., OR FOR 
A NEW TRIAL and MEMO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION [R-443-478; 596-630]/ the 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF [R-479-493; 638-652]; 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MEMO IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL [R-654-670]; and the Transcripts of the Argument on 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, dated January 17, and January 
27, 1989. [R-769, pp. 2-16; R-770, pp. 19-33] 
It is also clear from the trial transcript that Appellant was 
afforded no opportunity to object. Both sides rested at 12:30 p.m. 
on the last day of trial. [Tr. 786-87] Thereafter, the trial court 
heard and denied the parties' various Motions for Directed Verdict. 
[Tr. 786-800] At this time, 15 minutes before closing arguments, 
counsel had yet to even see the final Jury Instructions or Special 
Verdict. Counsel rightfully believed the final set of Instructions 
had been determined the day before at a conference with the Court 
for that specific purpose. [November 8, 1989, was Election Day, and 
the Court reporter was not present.] After a short recess [Tr. 
801], during which time the reporter was apparently dispatched, a 
set of final Instructions was produced. Respondent's counsel, over 
Appellant's strenuous and specific objections, convinced the Court 
to add Instruction 21a minutes before the jury was instructed. With 
3 
a t t e n t i o n r i v e c e a -*;A]<> fhaH, complete t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of 
Appe 11 ant ' Q ra ^&. . \ •>+ - z*~ ¥ ~,aZ 
A p p e l l a n t ' s : roposed Ins t ruc i icn :? -4 a r : *J *«---M i fc i^ .e; ; . ' " 
---
,Y
" * " .s t rucLiuu • - - "ei-te>, .* .thoux: d i s c u s s i o n 
sometime a i i r . he conference -*• r - **r : "t 
was not , «;;it', t h a t p o i n t , typed or f i n a l i z e d ana c -ui i . . c 
d i s c u s s e d , i'ramefi i at; e l y t h e r e a f t e r , t lie ji ry - n s t r j c : ed , 
Appel lan t ' s counse 1 hav i ng been >J t' i: rdi-M I i ipportu. 
the record . [Tr. 801 | 
Tin' :'.|„.)IP .'i.i I 1 ' p r i i i r r ' H'i d i s c u s s e d a f t e r the i u r y was 
i n s t r u c t e d , |"TE 801-802] However, t he f i n a l Spec u i VWijict mi 
s t i l l not a v a i l a b l e , and A p p e l l a n t ' s c o u n s e l , based on p r i o r 
discussi'..:".of ~.;^ . - ••'^ ;.Ld be allowed to eva lua t e 
l i a b i l i t y for c r e - d e a t h damaat^ r.. i r e " s t a t e s epa ra t e . 
law r e q u i r e s " "^ Specia l Verdict, was d e l i v e r e d t : . r; . r ~ e . 
s imultanecuo- • *. - .-- • ' " arcrument. 
There was ; o p o r t u n i t y rev it:.* « ^_ ^ ; t . 
Appellant! '"', c o u n s e l was - ~* ^wa*-^ -,^' *
 A\^ S p e c i a l " ' e r a i c : 
e f f e c t i v e . ^ ,_ . * menace'- -\3 * - < 
tcruuar, r.osing argument • ' t *ioe. apprwu.rie'. .-e 
Eer . ;.12. ic -'o^ fo,1; * * " ; p -v&^z A " Verdi "**" -"nr? rTi '549—"I ""^  
fnl
 After the jury retired, the trial court mdutr ,ocii unavailable tc ..e-i 
objections. [Tr.888-89] In all honesty, counsel did not realize Instructions 24 
and 32 had been eliminated until some days after the trial ended. Because of 
the last-second inclusion of Instructions I6a and 2la, it was necessary for 
Appellant's counsel to work on a complete revision of their closing argument as 
the Court instructed the jury,, Their absence from,, the Instructions effectively 
made the error invisible. 
fn2
 In that off-the-record discussion, the trial court refused to simply add the 
phrase "or the Estate of Betty George" to the end of question 3B, but did agree 
to add a separate line for pre-death damages to the Estate - a line that could 
not be reached if the jury answered "no" to '^e^ -i. --n ;u 
4 
The events of the last day of trial make a mockery of the 
purpose and intent of Rule 51. In addition, U.R.Civ.P. 4 6, directly 
applies to this case. Rule 4 6 provides: 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the 
court are unnecessary. It is sufficient that a 
party, at the time the ruling or order of the court 
is made or sought, makes known to the court the 
action which he desires the court take or his 
objection to the action of the court and his grounds 
therefor; and, if a party has no opportunity to 
object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, 
the absence of an objection does not thereafter 
prejudice him. 
Rule 4 6 has been applied to objections regarding Jury 
Instructions. See, Hanks v. Christensen. 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 
(1960); and Valentine v. Faulkner. 473 P.2d 482 (Ariz. App. 1970). 
Appellant subsequently made specific objections in the form of an 
immediate Motion for a New Trial. Therein, Appellant's objections 
were fully detailed to'the trial court long before the entry of 
Final Judgment on March 14, 1989. [R-709-12] See, Barson v. E.R. 
Sauibb & Sons. 682 P.2d 832, 837 (1984). Under these circumstances, 
justice and fairness demand that this Court carefully review the 
Jury Instructions given and not given, as well as the Special 
Verdict, which Appellant claims constituted error. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
APPELLANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS 24 AND 32. 
Respondent agrees that Appellant was entitled to have the jury 
instructed on his theory of the case [LDS Brief, p. 8], but argues 
that Appellant's Proposed Jury Instructions on causation do not 
correctly state Utah law. [LDS Brief, pp. 9-13] 
Appellant's principal theory for recovery was that the 
negligence of LDS Hospital completely deprived Betty George of 
5 
necessary medical d iagnosis and t rea tment , and was thereby a 
ii Ajiii ijiq |if.-i: iiiihil i i HI it r,f her a r res t ana deat ' "he factual 
testimony on l his theory was unanimous in Appe., a uni J,I , 
f u r the r supported "' v Appellant : .< c o m p e t e n t e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y 
r e g a r d i n g p m / niidU/ i iiu, i = =-*r o r - p o s e d p r o p e r i n s t r u c t i o n s 
s e t t i n g f o r t h t h a t t h e o r y , "" . a i r . c i r i ' : . P r o p o s e d I n s t r u >J L i on1. I 
"; R - 2 5 I , 2 6 1 | 
A p p e l l a n t h a s - * - i r i s c l i c t : : r s 
s u p p o r t i n g t h e " i n c r e a s e d : : s r e d u c e u .:.a;». . . f s u r v - - . 
I l"eor'|i f i r r e c o v e r y , R e s p o n d e n t ' s c o m p l a i n t : t h a t A p p e l l a n t : ; r *= : 
U t a h a u r h o r i f . . JCL :* - : ;.•>:?-•* .-, • . •• - ' * " ; r ; ? ~ . j . 
'
:) | i s - trie.-*, .ne::*- s i n c e \ r:e r a n C o u r t s h a ^ e y e i . ^ .... \ h e 
I s s111 > , Newsome :z,,*„,,„Jlxi2^ 1 1 6 U , A , -
P e 2 ( j
 .__ <Ur- • APP • 1989) * The Utdh <:ase i n? I ied - .aenu 
simply do not consider the issue of whether a jury she ._,.,. .,«- .:_owed 
-: •« ^ ' di s LOCdi fa .'ure " o procure necessary 
medica. diaunot, *: . eatment can b - :i mate 
causp '"if a subsequent :omoi Ication . 
where Appel lant ?ff°rea evidence 
f ^ . ' a ~ *- :u.^* . /^ ;osSi ^  * , , -n causat. 
experts expressly stated mar tne Hospit ^ /s egiigence proximately 
c-i... —-• njLnatjLii" *•• - chance for <i:aancs:s 
and treatment : ^  - „:a. i aving ^ _ ,• -, - . . 
fullv aware ~ r - " • H 7 " 0 : , . 13--11?, '.*, 1" : - I " , *.J-2v; an*: raae 
spec;:;-- i J ^ >-^~ ' i-"1 "t :prt -vider-^ <\n 
causation * ac f : ne "; n : - I V i c e , f i i o t *i»c:i: A p p e * ^ a n - r -e^~~—, f n 3 
f n 3
 At this point, one of respondent's physician experts. Dr. Trowbridge, had 
been called out of order and testified. [Tr.518-47] 
6 
and later after al l the evidence was in. Respondent moved for a 
Directed Verdict on the issue of causation. Both times the Motions 
were denied. [Tr. 561-565; 800-01] After the close of Appellant's 
evidence, the t r ia l court ruled: 
The Court listened with some care and attention to 
all the testimony regarding cause of death. That 
issue was raised on at least two occasions by counsel 
for both sides. The Court is persuaded that, 
although the weight of the evidence may be a question 
for the trier of fact, there is competent evidence to 
determine cause of death. Id., at 564-65 
Further, as fully detailed in the addenda to Appellant's 
initial brief,fn4 every nurse and physician who testified stated 
that the nurses had a duty to contact a physician about the i r 
observations on the afternoon of August 2nd, and every physician 
tes t i f ied that the pa t ien t ' s symptoms required immediate 
intervention, which would have been provided had they been made 
aware of the patient 's condition. Those facts in evidence, the 
court erred in not allowing the jury to perform i ts function and 
determine whether the Hospital's negligence was a substantial factor 
in causing the injuries and damages complained of. 
The facts in Thomas v. Corso. 265 Md. 84, 288 A.2d 379 (Md.App. 
1972), closely resemble those in the case at bar. There, Corso was 
injured when struck by a vehicle. He was admitted to a hospital, 
fn4
 Respondent's "presumption" about the Addenda to Appellant 's opening br ief i s 
wrong. [LDS Brief, p .7 , fn.2] Rather than f i l e las t -second ex parte Motions to 
t h i s Court, Appellant requested permission to f i l e an overlength b r i e f three 
weeks before h i s b r i e f was due. The Motion was denied without explanat ion. 
Thereafter, pursuant to t h i s Court 's express i n v i t a t i o n , Apellant presented his 
br ief to the C le rk ' s Office prior to filing and were given assurance by the 
Clerk tha t the form and content of the Brief and Addenda were app rop r i a t e . 
Consequently, if respondent made a Motion to Str ike the Addendum [no such Motion 
has been provided to Apellant , and does not appear in the reco rd ] , i t i s 
without merit and should be denied. 
7 
and nurses contacted the on-cal l physician, provided information and 
received i n s t r u c t i o n s . f n 5 There were disputes as to the nature and 
extent of the information g iven . La ter compl ica t ions went 
unreported, and the pa t i en t died of t raumat ic shock without ever 
having been diagnosed or t rea ted by a physician. 
One of the phys ic ian ' s defenses was t ha t death was inev i tab le 
due t o the na ture (learned a f t e r - t h e - f a c t ) of Corso 's i n j u r i e s . 
When confronted with the ul t imate quest ion, the defendant doctor 
declined to say tha t he could have saved Corso's l i f e i f not i f ied by 
the nurses, s t a t i n g ; "Only God knows the answer to tha t ques t ion . " 
He s ta ted only tha t he might have. Id., at 386 The Court held: 
Dr. Thomas' admission tha t he bel ieved he might have 
helped Corso, might have revived Corso i f he had been 
ca l led at 12:05 a.m., and tha t lack of treatment by a 
phys ic ian inc reased Corso 's danger of los ing h i s 
l i f e , t o g e t h e r with Dr. F u r i e ' s tes t imony t h a t 
Corso's chance for survival was l inked to t reatment , 
and t h a t shock must be promptly and e f f e c t i v e l y 
t r e a t e d or i t w i l l become i r r e v e r s i b l e , a r e 
suf f ic ien t to jus t i fy a jury finding of a subs tan t ia l 
p o s s i b i l i t y of surv iva l which was destroyed by the 
f a i l u r e of Dr. Thomas to examine, diagnose and t r e a t 
Corso a t any t ime a f t e r Corso a r r i v e d a t t he 
Emergency Room . . . 
From what we have already s ta ted , the jury could have 
reasonably concluded under the circumstances of t h i s 
case t h a t i f Dr. Thomas had performed h i s duty to 
a t t e n d Corso p e r s o n a l l y s h o r t l y a f t e r he was 
telephoned at 11:30 p.m., Dr. Thomas might well have 
been ab le t o have saved h i s l i f e and t h a t t h i s 
negligent conduct was one of the direct and proximate 
causes of Corso ' s dea th , concurrent with the 
negligence of the nurses. Id., a t 390 (emphasis 
added) 
fn5 Here, the evidence i s uncontradicted that the information given Dr. Lloyd 
was f a l s e or incomplete, and that no physic ian anywhere was apprised of c r i t i c a l 
hosp i ta l s t a f f observat ions that required immediate a t t e n t i o n . [Tr. 385-410, 
635-36, 613-15, 619-30, 697, 703, 711-12, 724-28] 
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No testimony on the medical cause of death was requi red . The 
re levant question to the jury t he r e , as i t should have been here, 
was: Did the f a i lu re of the hosp i t a l to procure necessary medical 
care , contr ibute to the cause of death? Obviously the primary cause 
of Corso fs death was the unfortunate fact t ha t he was run over by a 
car . He went to the hosp i t a l , the hospi ta l had a duty to make sure 
he got necessary medical t reatment , i t f a i l ed to do so, and Corso 
died. The causation issue thus presented i s not complex, technical 
or necessa r i ly medical. The Corso Court had no s t rugg le with the 
issue of proximate cause on the par t of the hosp i t a l : 
The testimony in regard to Corso's v i t a l s igns a t 
12:05 a.m. and of Dr. Thomas and Dr. Fur ie i s 
s u f f i c i e n t t o enable a jury to f ind a causa l 
connection between the ac ts of the nurses and Corso fs 
death. Id., a t 392 
Of course, as the undisputed fac ts demonstrate, the negligence 
of the h o s p i t a l in t h i s case was far worse s ince i t completely 
depr ived Bet ty George of t he o p p o r t u n i t y for d i a g n o s i s and 
treatment . fn6 
Under these circumstances, Appellant was absolutely e n t i t l e d to 
have the jury i n s t r u c t e d on h is theory of the case . The t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s fa i lu re to do so was revers ib le e r ro r . 
f n 6
 The fo l lowing references to the testimony s e t forth in ADDENDUM I to 
Appel lant ' s Opening Brief contain some of the evidence from which the jury could 
have found that the negl igence of LDS Hospital proximately caused the arrest and 
brain death of Betty George on August 2, 1986, but which was precluded by 
Ins truct ion 21a requiring Appellant to prove the cause of death through 
phys ic ian test imony. See, ADDENDUM I, pp.5-14 , 16-27, 31-32 35-37, 39-49, 54-
64, 66-70, 72-78, 81-84. See also, the SUPPLEMENTAL ADDENDUM attached hereto 
containing references from the P a r t i a l Transcript [R-771], added to the record 
by Respondent LDS Hospi ta l . 
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III. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT CORRECTLY STATE 
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO APPELLANT'S CASE 
AGAINST LDS HOSPITAL, AND TENDED TO CONFUSE 
AND MISLEAD THE JURY. 
Appellant's claims at trial were in no way related to the 
conduct of any physician. Nor were they about diagnosis or 
treatment by a physician. Appellant's case was against LDS 
Hospital, and concerned solely with the conduct, or in this case, 
the inaction of the Hospital staff. The sole issue was whether the 
failure of the Hospital staff to procure necessary care by a 
physician was a contributing proximate cause of the patient's 
subsequent complication. As the trial court correctly held numerous 
times during the trial, the underlying medical cause of death was 
irrelevant. [See, Addendum II to Appellant's Opening Brief.] 
Respondent nevertheless argues that Instructions 16a and 21a, 
requiring that Appellant had to prove the medical cause of death, 
and that the only competent expert testimony on causation under 
these circumstances must come from a physician, are correct 
statements of the law. [LDS Brief, pp. 15-18] Respondent is wrong. 
Not a single case cited by Respondent actually stands for the 
proposition for which it is advanced: That in a case solely against 
a hospital, based solely on the conduct of the hospital staff -
expert testimony from a physician is required to establish 
causation. All of the cases cited by Respondent involved physician 
defendants, except Hoopiiaina v. IHC, 740 P.2d 270 (Ut. App. 1987) 
and Schmidt v. THC. 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981). 
Schmidt is very important for what it does not say. The case 
involved catheterization, a procedure presumably outside the common 
knowledge of laymen. Both sides called physicians to testify as 
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experts on the subject. The Utah Supreme Court, in this, its first 
decision solely involving a hospital defendant that Appellant is 
aware of, said this: 
In order to recover for the negligence of a medical 
practitioner, a plaintiff must prove that 1) there 
was negligence and 2) the negligence was a proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injury. 
That is exactly the law set forth in Appellant's Proposed 
Instruction 16 [R-510], which Appellant claims was a correct 
statement of the law, but which was confused and overshadowed by 
Respondent's Instruction 16a and 21a. The Schmidt Court did not 
require plaintiff to prove the underlying medical cause of a 
complication, nor did it require physician testimony. 
In Hoopiiaina. the plaintiff claimed that a drug, mistakenly 
administered by a nurse, caused injuries. Plaintiff produced no 
expert testimony at all, despite numerous admonitions to do so. In 
upholding summary judgment in favor of the hospital, this court 
affirmed the requirement of expert testimony, not testimony from a 
physician. Hoopiiaina is further distinguishable since it involves 
the relatively complex question of whether a specific drug could 
cause a specific result. 
Appellant again asserts his position that the trial court 
should have submitted the causation issue in this case to the jury 
without the requirement for any expert testimony. See, Thomas v. 
Corso. supra. Expert testimony, such as supplied by Appellant, is 
necessary to establish the standard of care for health care 
providers, as well as the breach of the standard of care. Since 
Appellant presented such evidence, the jury should have been allowed 
to determine the factual question of whether the Hospital's 
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negligence was a con t r ibu t ing proximate cause of Betty George's 
a r r e s t . That i s exactly what the t r i a l court ruled when i t denied 
Respondent's second Motion for a Directed Verdict on the causation 
issue: 
The Court finds that there has been an abundance of 
testimony regarding standard of care, [and] alleged 
breach of that standard, which creates the factual 
issue [on causation] for the trier of fact. And the 
Motion for Directed Verdict by the defendant is 
denied. [Tr. 800-01] (emphasis added) 
Immediately after that ruling, the trial court added 
Instructions 16a and 21a, which were completely at odds with the 
court's consistent rulings throughout the trial, contrary to law and 
prejudicially unfair to Appellant. It is impossible to reconcile the 
fact that the trial court ruled there was a factual question to go 
to the jury on causation, and then five minutes later instructed the 
jury not to consider the facts and evidence introduced by 
Appellant's qualified experts which had previously been admitted. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it is reversible error for 
a court to take from a jury a factual issue on which there is 
disputed evidence. In Harris v. Utah Transit Authority. 671 P.2d 
217, 220 (Utah 1983), the Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict in 
favor of defendants after finding that an erroneous instruction on 
proximate cause had the effect of directing a verdict on that issue. 
The Court held: 
In the present case the disputed instruction was 
erroneous because it failed to submit the proximate 
cause issue to the jury for determination • . . 
Where the evidence is in dispute, including the 
inferences from the evidence, the issue should be 
submitted to the jury . . . 
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[T]he right to trial by jury is a basic 
principle of our system that cannot be allowed to be 
eroded by improper intrusions on the juryfs 
prerogative. (citations omitted) 
No attempt was made by Respondent to distinguish or otherwise 
counter Appellant's relevant and persuasive authorities from other 
jurisdictions, where courts have ruled that there was no need for 
expert testimony in cases factually similar to this one. Nor was any 
rationale offered as to why the jury should have been precluded from 
considering the testimony of Appellant's qualified hospital experts 
on the result of negligent conduct exclusively within a hospital 
staff's duty and obligation. 
Crowe v. Provost, 374 S.W.2d 645 (Tenn.App. 1963), is a perfect 
example of Appellant's theory correctly applied. There, plaintiffs 
claimed that the nurse involved failed to attend to a sick child, 
and to correctly report his condition to the physician. At trial, 
both defendants testified that the child's death was sudden and 
unexpected due to an overwhelming infection. In addition, the 
defendants called six local physicians, all of whom testified that 
the child died from an overwhelming infection, and there was nothing 
either the doctor or nurse could have done to prevent it had they 
been present. Id., at 650 
Plaintiff's theory on causation was that the child aspirated 
vomit. In support of their theory, plaintiffs called one registered 
nurse. She testified that the child's symptoms required the nurse 
to notify a doctor, to stay with the patient until the doctor's 
arrival, and to provide whatever assistance she was capable of. 
Plaintiffs' nurse expert also testified that it was possible for a 
person to choke to death on their own vomit. 
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The defendants appealed from an adverse jury ve rd i c t . The only 
ques t ion on appeal was whether the negl igence of the nurse 
contributed as a proximate cause of the death of the ch i ld . Id., at 
648 The court , in language d i r ec t l y applicable here, held: 
We t h i n k j u r o r s of o r d i n a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e and judgment, although not s k i l l e d in medical sc ience , 
are capable of reaching a conclusion without the aid 
of exper t tes t imony, from these proved f ac t s and 
circumstances, whether 
injur ious consequences or death would probably r e s u l t 
t o a p a t i e n t wi thout proper medical or nurs ing 
a t t en t i on . . . f n 7 
fn7 Compare the foregoing to the testimony of Dr. Lahey, the l a s t physician to 
evaluate Betty George p r io r to her a r r e s t . [Tr.621-23] 
Q: Do you see the nurse ' s note at 2:20 in the afternoon, r igh t af ter Mrs. 
George got back [from the ICU], describing her as very d i s t an t and incoherent at 
times? 
A: Yes, I do. 
Q: That's the kind of change which, if made known to you, you would take 
action on, wouldn't you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You would want to know what was causing that potentially dangerous 
change in condition, wouldn't you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: If, Dr. Lahey, you had been aware of this change in Mrs. George's 
condition that you have just discussed . . . you would have had four and a half 
hours prior to the time she arrested to investigate the reason for that change, 
wouldn't you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: The last time you saw Mrs. George, the thought did not occur to you 
that she might be brain dead five hours later, did it? 
A: Didn't occur to me in the least. 
Q: If you had suspected that she had a respiratory condition or an 
infectious condition that might result in that, you should have never let her 
out of ICU, should you have? 
A: I shouldn't be practicing medicine right now. 
Q: When you last saw Mrs George in the ICU, you weren't thinking that 
[her condition] was going to get worse, did you? 
A: No, I had no reason to believe that it was going to get worse. 
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Opinions of medical experts as to the cause of death, 
. . . do not invade the province of the jury, but go 
to them to be weighted along with the other evidence 
in passing on the question of causation; or, stating 
the rule more broadly, when expert opinion as to 
causation is admissible, the weight of the opinion 
should be determined by the jury . . 
Where negligence and injury are proved, a causal 
connection between them may be established by 
circumstantial evidence, by inferences from physical 
facts . . . 
Accordingly, we are of the opinion the medical proof 
in the record that some condition for which the 
defendants would not be liable because not due to any 
act of negligence on their part might have caused the 
death of the child, does not destroy or overcome as 
a matter of law the probative force of the evidence 
that the more probable cause was the negligence of 
the defendant nurse in abandoning an ill and 
unconscious child. Id., at 650-51 
In this case, one of Appellant's theories was that Betty 
George's initial arrest and brain death were the result of lack of 
oxygen. The causal link between the Hospital's negligence and the 
[Tr. 629-30] Q: You have been practicing for how longf Dr. Lahey? 
A: I finished my residency in 1981. Eight years . . 
Q: During that period of time, you have had patients who have been 
infected or septic before, haven't you? 
A: Yes, many. 
Q: You have had patients who have been in much worse condition than Mrs. 
George was in the last time you saw herr haven't you? 
A: Many. 
Q: And they didn't all die, did they? 
A: God forbid. No, they did not. 
Q: The vast majority of them didn't, did they? 
A: Exactly. 
Q: There is not one of those patients that you ever gave up on, is there? 
A: That's right. 
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result was expressed by Appellant's experts, supported by the 
treating physicians, and inferred by defendants' experts. [See, 
Footnote 6, Addendum I to Appellant's Opening Brief, and the 
Supplemental Addendum attached hereto.] Indeed, there was competent 
testimony from Appellant's expert respiratory therapist that the 10 
minute delay in initiating resuscitation during the Code procedure 
was enough alone to have caused her brain death. [Tr. 317-22] The 
trial court previously qualified Mr. Owings as an expert, and 
specifically ruled that his opinions should be considered by the 
jury in reaching a verdict. [Tr. 301-02] Jury Instructions 16a and 
21a told the jury not to consider Mr. Owing's expert opinion on 
causation, and thereby completely eliminated yet another opportunity 
to find in Appellant's favor. 
Given negligence and injury, the jury should have been allowed to 
make their own factual determination on causation from the 
circumstances and inferences to be drawn from the facts. Northern 
Trust Co. v. Louis A, Weiss Memorial Hospital, 493 N.E.2d 6, 11-12 
(111. App. 1986), Restatment (Second) of Torts, §323 comment a 
(1965) . Jury Instructions 16a and 21a precluded the jury from 
considering the testimony of Appellant's experts, prohibited them 
from making a factual determination as to causation from the 
totality of the evidence, and required the jury to direct their 
deliberations to the irrelevant medical cause of death, which was an 
event totally distinct from the initial arrest upon which 
Appellant's claims were based.fn8 
fn8
 Dr. Lahey testified that Betty George's death was inevitable after the 
initial arrest on August 2nd. [Tr. 629] 
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Respondent appears to take the illogical position that 
testimony from qualified hospital experts could never be considered 
by a jury in determining causation, However, in Farrow v. Health 
Services Corp.. 604 P.2d 474, 477-78 (1979) [LDS Brief, p. 16], our 
Supreme Court reversed summary judgment in favor of LDS Hospital and 
a physician, based, in part, on the testimony of a nurse expert. 
The Court specifically found that the nurse's testimony raised 
issues of fact which had to be determined by the jury. 
Clearly, the history of medical malpractice law in this state, 
as well as the requirement for expert testimony, emanates from 
actions against physicians and surgeons, not hospitals. For example, 
in Frederiflkaon v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772, 773 (1951), [LDS 
Brief, pp. 16-17], the Court's holding is quite specific: 
The better-reasoned cases announce a rule of law to 
the effect that in those cases which depend upon 
knowledge of the scientific effect of medicine, the 
results of surgery. or whether the attending 
physician exercised the ordinary care, skill and 
knowledge required of doctors in the community in 
which he serves, must ordinarily be established by 
the testimony of physicians and surgeons, (emphasis 
added) 
The law in Utah has been consistently so applied ever since. The 
problem with its application here, and the problem with Instructions 
16a and 21a is that Appellant's case was not about the scientific 
effect of medicine, or the results of surgery. Nor did Appellant's 
case have anything to do with physicians. Rather, Appellant's case 
was concerned simply with what happens when hospital staff fails in 
its primary duty to alert physicians as to their patients' 
condition, so that diagnosis and treatment can be rendered. As 
such, it falls squarely into the realm of cases which a jury can 
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determine from their own common sense and experience. At the very 
least, the jury should have been allowed to consider the competent 
testimony from Appellant's experts on causation, expressly admitted 
by the trial court, and upon which the trial court's previous 
rulings had been based. 
Instructions 16a and 21a told the jury they could not consider 
the testimony of Appellant's experts on causation, and thereby 
constituted prejudicial error. Appellant also asserts that the 
Instructions misstated the law. Respondent produced no authority to 
the contrary. 
A. THE INSTRUCTIONS TAKEN AS A WHOLE DO NOT 
CURE THE PREJUDICIAL ERROR CAUSED BY THE 
FAILURE TO GIVE APPELLANT'S INSTRUCTIONS 
24 AND 32, OR THE PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
GIVING INSTRUCTIONS 16a AND 21a. 
Respondent claims, without explanation, that the errors in the 
Instructions and verdict form which are the subject of this appeal, 
were harmless. [LDS Brief, pp. 19-21] However, it is well-
established that instructions which tend to confuse, mislead or 
incorrectly advise the jury on the law constitute prejudicial, 
reversible error. Mikkelsen v. Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Ut. App. 
1987) . While it is true that this Court must consider the 
Instructions as a whole, the purpose of that inquiry is to 
determine whether the issues of fact and applicable law were 
presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way. Biaaler v. 
Mapleton Irrigation Canal Co., 669 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1983). 
That would, for example, require the Court to read the clear, 
concise and correct recitation of Appellant's burden of proof in 
Instruction 16 [R-510], and compare it to the convoluted and 
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confusing attempt to set forth the same burden in 16a. [R-511-12] 
It is confusing even now. Next, the Court should consider the 
jurors in their contemplation of Instruction 21a. This was the 
Instruction that Respondent's counsel read to the jury, referred to 
extensively, and emphasized was the Instruction on which the jury 
was to base its decision on proximate cause. [R-881-82] The simple 
fact is, that if the jurors followed Instruction 21a as Respondent's 
counsel exhorted them, they were required to answer question 3B 
negatively on the Special Verdict form. Instructions 16a and 21a 
effectively directed the verdict on the critical disputed issue of 
causation, and there was nothing any other Instruction or 
combination of Instructions could do to alter that fact. 
In Watters v. Querry. 588 P.2d 702 (Utah 1978), our Supreme 
Court reversed a jury verdict because one instruction relating to 
causation was erroneous, even though the other instructions given 
correctly stated the law. The Court's reasoning is applicable here: 
The fact that other instructions were given 
inconsistent with the one in question and consistent 
with the law, cannot properly be regarded as curing 
the misconception the jury might have formed from the 
erroneous instruction complained of. The jurors 
would not know which instruction was correct and 
which one was in error, and thus would simply be in a 
position of not knowing which instruction to follow; 
and neither the parties nor the court would know 
which they did follow. 
See also, Harris v. Utah Transit, supra, 671 P.2d 222-23, where an 
erroneous instruction on proximate cause was found to be reversible 
error even though other correct instructions were given which would 
have allowed the jury to reach a different verdict. All that is 
necessary for reversal is that there be a reasonable likelihood of a 
different verdict absent the error. Id. 
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Similarly, the failure to give Appellant's proposed 
Instructions 24 and 32, completely eliminated any opportunity for 
the jury to consider Appellant's "reduced chance of recovery -
increased risk of injury" theory. No other Instruction or 
combination of Instructions in any way mitigates the prejudicial 
effect of that error. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
APPELLANT A NEW TRIAL. 
Based on the record, together with Appellant's Opening Brief 
and the foregoing Reply, it is obvious that the jury should have 
been allowed to consider Appellant's theory of the case, and that 
there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have made a 
factual finding of causation in Appellant's favor without the 
assistance of expert testimony from a physician. Errors in the Jury 
Instructions prohibited the jury from doing their job, and deprived 
Appellant of having his theory of the case considered. 
In Goff v. Doctors General Hospital, 333 P.2d 29 (Cal. App. 
1958), the trial court granted plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial 
against the defendant hospital. There, Mrs. Goff experienced 
internal bleeding after childbirth. The nurses reported the 
patient's condition to her doctor for awhile, but stopped doing so 
as her condition deteriorated. The patient eventually went into 
shock and hemorrhaged to death without medical intervention. The 
hospital predictably contended that its negligence was not a 
proximate cause of the death. Plaintiffs, as here, presented common 
sense evidence that the hospital should have reported the patient's 
condition, with the end in view that prompt and adequate measures be 
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taken to safeguard Mrs. Goff's life. In its opinion granting the 
Motion for New Trial, the trial court in Goff stated: 
It is apparent from the evidence with particular 
reference to the time of 9:00 p.m., and 10:30 p.m, 
and 11:00 p.m., that both nurses in the exercise of 
ordinary care could have taken action that would have 
guarded the safety of Mrs. Goff and that this 
nonfeasance contributed to the proximate cause of her 
death. Id., at 33 (emphasis added) 
In upholding the Order for a New Trial, the Appellate Court held: 
Appellants also contend that if either of the 
appellate nurses was negligent the negligence was not 
a proximate cause of the death of Mrs. Goff. 
However, the question of whether or not the 
negligence of the nurses was a proximate cause is one 
of fact. Conceding that Dr. Ashley was negligent (as 
the physicians in this case were not), still if nurse 
Lee had called the doctor at 10:30 p.m., when she was 
aware the condition of the patient was critical, who 
can say that the same result would have occurred. 
The patient may have been in shock. The doctor may 
have been able to insert a needle for a blood 
transfusion. The longer the delay, the more critical 
the condition of the patient became. Time was a most 
important factor. In the instant case, a finding 
that the negligence of the nurse was a contributing 
cause of the death is supported by the record. Id. 
(emphasis added) 
Indeed. Who can say what would have happened if the LDS 
Hospital staff had done its job in this case? Certainly not the 
experts called by the Hospital who were not there, and who did not 
perform any of the tests and procedures they would have done for 
their own patients, most of whom don't die, in similar 
circumstances. [Tr. (Lloyd) 409-10, (Trowbridge) 544-47, (Lahey) 
606-15, 619-630, (Weinstein) 651-57, (Elliot) 770, 773-74] The 
causation issue in this case was a question of fact for the jury, 
based on all of the evidence, all of the circumstances, and the 
inferences that could be derived therefrom. The trial court errors 
on the Jury Instructions and Special Verdict form removed most of 
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Appellant's evidence from the jury's consideration, and with it, the 
opportunity to make appropriate factual conclusions regarding 
causation. If allowed to do their job, there was substantial 
unrefuted evidence from which the jury could have determined that 
the Hospital's negligence was a contributing cause of the death of 
Betty George. That the Hospital's negligence resulted in 
substantial injuries and damage to Mrs. George prior to her death 
was conclusively proved and not rebutted. 
Justice demands that Appellant be awarded a New Trial. 
CONCLUSION 
THE ERRORS SET FORTH DEPRIVED APPELLANT OP A FAIR 
TRIAL AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP A PROPER RECORD. 
1. Appellant had no opportunity to object to erroneous and 
prejudicial Jury Instructions prior to the time the jury was 
instructed. Appellant had no opportunity to object to the Special 
Verdict before it was provided to the jury for their deliberations. 
2. On at least one occasion, on the record [Tr.328] and 
several more off the record, the trial court ruled consistently with 
Appellant's theory of the case that the medical cause of death (as 
opposed to whether the hospital staff's negligence contributed to 
the cause of Betty George's initial arrest) was irrelevant. In 
reliance on these rulings, Appellant refrained from calling Dr. 
Robert Flinner, the Pathologist who conducted the autopsy, who had 
previously been deposed on that subject. [R-758] After the close 
of evidence and just prior to closing arguments, the trial court 
told the jury that Appellant was required to prove the medical cause 
of death, knowing full well that Appellant, in reliance on the 
court's prior rulings, had never attempted to do so. 
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3. Early in Appellant's case in chief, on the record [Tr.323-
331], and several times off the record, the trial court ruled that 
only someone, in an official capacity participated in determining 
the cause of death could testify on that subject. [The only person 
in that category was Dr. Robert Flinner, and possibly Dr. Kimball 
Lloyd.] The Court specifically stated: 
The Court will, on the record, instruct counsel not 
to ask this witness, nor any other expert witness as 
to the decedent 's cause of death, who did not 
participate in making that determination, so there is 
no misunderstanding on that part. [Tr. 331] 
Appellant obeyed the trial court's order. Specifically, 
Appellant refrained from questioning their own expert witnesses on 
the medical cause of death, and did not call their own physician 
experts who had been retained at great expense, and could have 
testified on that issue.fn9 Thereafter however, the trial court 
allowed Respondent to call three witnesses who had nothing to do 
with the Mrs. George, to give their purely speculative opinions on 
cause of death. This testimony predictably became the focus of 
Respondent's defense. In addition, under Instructions 16a, 21a and 
the Special Verdict, Appellant was held to a burden of producing 
evidence on cause of death which the trial court had previously 
prohibited. 
4. During trial, the district court properly qualified 
Appellant's nurse and respiratory therapist as experts, to testify 
as to whether the Hospital's negligence was a proximate cause of the 
injuries and damage complained of. [See, Addendum III to Appellant's 
fn9 These experts were, J. Joshua Kopelman, M.D., an OB-GYN specialist from 
Aurora, Colorado; and Richard Sweet, M.D., also an 0B-GYN, and infectious 
disease specialist from San Francisco. 
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Opening Brief.] After the close of evidence, and just before 
closing argument, the jury was instructed that Appellant had the 
burden to prove the medical cause of death through a physician, or 
lose. Instructions 16a and 21a required the jury to ignore the 
previously admitted testimony of Appellant's experts on causation. 
5. The trial court refused to submit a Special Verdict which 
would have allowed the jury to independently consider whether the 
hospital's negligence was a proximate cause of damages suffered by 
Betty George prior to her death - a major component of Appellant's 
case. 
6. The trial court failed to grant a legally required directed 
verdict in favor of the defendant physicians, and refused to consult 
the record which would have established the error, when invited by 
counsel to do so. [Tr. 798-99] 
7. Despite all of these unfair and extremely prejudicial last-
minute events, the trial court refused to allow Appellant's counsel 
an opportunity to rebut Respondent's closing argument which, fearing 
no rebuttal, contained a number of false and prejudicial statements. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant respectfully requests that the Judgment 
of the Third District Court be REVERSED, and the case be REMANDED 
for a NEW TRIAL, with the appeal costs awarded to the Appellant. 
Dated this J^day of DfMmgftf , 1989. 
COLLARD & RUSSELL 
STEVE RUSSELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ELISE ZIEGENBUSCH, R.N. was working as charge nurse in the 
LDS Hospital ICU unit on the afternoon of August 2, 1986. She was 
called as a witness by respondent. Her testimony appears in the 
supplemental transcript [R-771] at pages 3-23. 
Page 8: 
Q: [By Mr. Burbidge] What can you recall from 
those discussions [in the ICU with Dr. Lahey]? 
A: He felt like the angiogram, to determine 
whether she had had a pulmonary embolus, was 
negative. And he felt like the problems she had 
been having with her lungs were more of a problem 
that a lot of patients get after they have surgery. 
And that is that they don't breathe deep enough, 
whether it is because of pain or because of 
anesthesia. But they need to breathe more deeply, 
to expand their lungs. And he felt this was her 
problem, that she just needed to do some 
respiratory exercises, which usually the nurse can 
help with, or else the respiratory therapist can 
help with the exercises. He felt like that if she 
was just able to breathe more deeply, that would . 
. . clear her lungs, and she wouldn't be having the 
problems she was having. * 
Q: How did Mrs. George appear to you, as she was 
there in the ICU. 
A: She did not appear acutely ill . . . 
* Note: Following her return to the 8th floor, Mrs. George 
received no respiratory exercises from the LDS Hospital nurses, 
nor was she seen at all by anyone from the respiratory therapy 
department until after her arrest. 
Page 10: 
Q: Based on your background and experience . . . 
were you uncomfortable with the decision of Dr. 
Lahey, that this patient should not remain in the 
ICU? 
1 
A: From my point of view, she did not need to be 
in the ICU . . . 
Page 15: 
Q: [By Mr. Russel l] [Y]ou know, don ' t you, t h a t 
one of the most important functions of a nurse with 
a very s ick p a t i e n t , on a r egu l a r f loor , i s t o 
r epor t changes in the p a t i e n t ' s condi t ion , i s n ' t 
i t ? 
A: Yes. 
Pages 16-17: 
Q: You indicated it is an important function of 
the nurses to help doctors make decisions, didn't 
you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Nurses are expected to tell doctors what they 
think, aren't they? 
A: Yes, they are. 
Q: Dr. Lahey, in the ICU, on the afternoon of 
August 2nd, thought that Betty was okay, didn't he? 
A: Yes, he did. 
Q: And so did you? 
A: Yes. 
Page 18-19: 
Q: Dr. Lahey attributed the patient's respiratory 
problems to this condition that she had had 
previously, correct? 




Q: Dr. Lahey thought she needed to be seen by 
resp i ra to ry t he r ap i s t s , d idn ' t he? 
2 
A: Yes. But for atelectasis, the nurses can 
handle deep breathing . . . 
Q: You and Dr. Lahey both thought, when Mrs, 
George left, that she needed to have pulmonary 
assessments and exercises, didn't you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you tell the nurses on Eight East that? 
A: I can't be sure. I'm sure I must have, because 
that was the problem. That's what we felt like the 
problem was. 
Q: Did the nurses on Eight East inform you they 
didn't know how to do a pulmonary assessment? 
[See, Tr. 75, 77, 134] 
A: Nurses are trained to do that. 




Q: [By Mr. Burbidge] As a nurse , car ing for a 
p a t i e n t , who gives d i r e c t i o n s as t o what care 
should be given to the pa t ient? 
A: The physic ians wr i te the o rders , and then the 
nurses car ry out the orders , and if we feel like 
there is a problem, then we will talk to the 
physician and work out another plan, if we don ft 
agree with what is going on or something like that. 
3 
MARGENE WITHERS, R.N. was a former supervisor of Nurse 
Soraghan, who was acting as the "one-on-one special duty nurse" 
when Betty George arrested after not having been seen by a 
physician for over two hours. She was called as a witness by 
respondent, her testimony appears in the supplemental transcript 
[R-771], at pages 23-36, 
Pages 31-32: 
Q: [By Mr. Russe l l ] When you take ca re of a 
p a t i e n t one- to-one, you are supposed to ca r e fu l l y 
monitor the pa t i en t , a r e n ' t you? 
A: . . . yes. 
Q: You are supposed to watch carefully, and write 
down what you see about the patient, aren't you? 
A: That's right. 
Q: When you take care of a sick patient one-on-
one, probably the most important function you have 
is to report changes in the patient's condition to 
the doctors, isn't it? 
A: We call physicians when changes occur. That 's 
part of the nurse's job. 
Q: You call them whenever you think it might be 
necessary, don't you? 
A: Right. 
Q: It is the nurses duty to get help for a patient 
if the nurse thinks she needs it, isn't it? 
A: Yes. 
Q: That's what nurses are for, isn't it? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Particularly where you have a one-on-one, 
special duty nurse with instructions to carefully 
watch a patient, right? 
A: Yes. 
